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Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium
Fred Weisman*
T HE RECENT OHIO SuPRFM COURT RULING in Clouston v. Remlinger
Oldsmobile Cadillac Inc.' reversed a rule which had existed in Ohio
for over fifty years. Ohio has now been added to the growing list of
states which allow to a wife an action for damages for loss of con-
sortium arising from negligent injury to her husband.
Prior Rule
Prior to this decision, the leading case in Ohio was Smith v.
Nicholas Building Co.,2 which held that although a husband was al-
lowed a cause of action for negligent injury to his wife for his loss of
consortium, the wife was not entitled to recover for her loss of con-
sortium arising out of injury to her husband caused by the defendant's
negligence. The reason advanced by the court back in 1915 was that
the husband's action for loss of consortium was accompanied by a loss
of services claim, but the wife's action for loss of consortium was not
accompanied by a loss of services claim. The husband never had an
action for loss of consortium unaccompanied by a claim for loss of the
services of his wife. Since any claim for loss of the husband's services
would be solely the husband's, the court reasoned that the wife should
not therefore be permitted a cause of action for loss of consortium.
In almost the same breath, the court further explained that there
was "no question" but that either a husband or a wife may recover
without alleging any loss of services claim if the injury inflicted was an
intentionally inflicted injury, as distinguished from a negligently in-
flicted injury.3 The wife in Ohio has, in fact, long been able to bring an
action for loss of consortium arising from the intentional torts of
alienation of affection4 and criminal conversation. 5
It is therefore interesting to note that notwithstanding the ac-
knowledgment of damage and injury to either the wife or husband for
loss of consortium, the court was somehow inclined to permit the right
of action to the wife for damages intentionally caused, but not for those
*Of the Cleveland, Ohio Bar.
[Author's Note: The author wishes to express his appreciation to Andrew A.
Markus of the Cleveland State Law Review Board of Editors for his able assistance
in the preparation of this article.]
1 22 Ohio St. 2d 65, 258 N.E. 2d 230 (1970); see also, Durham v. Gabriel, 22 Ohio St.
2d 75, 258 N.E. 2d 236 (1970) decided the same day.
2 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
3 Id. at 205.
4 Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621 (1878).
5 Smith v. Lyon, 9 Ohio App. 141 (1918).
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identical damages if they were negligently caused. While no rational
explanation appears to have ever been offered for such a distinction,
this was nevertheless the prevailing law in Ohio until Clouston. Recog-
nizing the fallacy in a rule which deprives the wife of recovery of dam-
ages for a substantial injury directly produced to her by reason of the
defendant's wrongdoing, many states have reversed their previous posi-
tion and have permitted the wife to recover for loss of consortium due
to negligent injury to her husband.,
Outstanding in its analysis and discussion of the problem is the
landmark case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc.7 where the ancient and
usual reasons advanced for denying the wife her right of recovery are
carefully detailed and with corresponding precision struck down by
Judge Clark, who commented:
- . . after piercing the thin veils of reasoning employed to sustain
the rule, we have been unable to disclose any substantial rationale
on which we would be willing to predicate a denial of a wife's
action for loss of consortium due to a negligent injury to her hus-
band.8
Judge Clark states that the reasons given by various courts for depriva-
tion of this right of action to the wife are that the injury to the wife
is too indirect to be compensable, that her injuries are too remote to be
capable of measure, and that the common law recognized no such right
without a showing of loss of services which, however, was solely the
husband's claim.9
6 Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W. 2d 41 (1957);
Gist v. French, 136 Cal. App. 2d 247, 288 P. 2d 1003 (1955); Stenta v. Leblang, 185 A.
2d 759 (Del. 1962) indicated apparent approval of Yonner v. Adams, 53 Del. 229, 167
A. 2d 717 (1961); Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., 183 F. 2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert.
den., 71 S. Ct. 80, 340 U.S. 852; Bailey v. Wilson, 100 Ga. App. 405, 111 S.E. 2d 106
(1959); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E. 2d 881 (1960); Troue v. Marker, 252
N.E. 2d 800 (Ind. 1969); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W. 2d 480 (1956); Kot-
siris v. Ling, 451 S.W. 2d 411 (Ky. App. 1970); Deems v. Western Maryland Railway
Co., 247 Md. 95, 231 A. 2d 514 (1967); Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp.
820 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W. 2d 227 (1960);
Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W. 2d 539 (Mo. 1963); Duffy v. Lipsman-
Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1953); Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp.
448 (D. Neb. 1953); Ekalo v. Constructive Services Corp. of America, 46 N.J. 82, 215
A. 2d 1 (1965); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y. 2d 498, 239 N.E. 2d
897 (1968); Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Ore. 429, 397 P. 2d 529 (1964); Mariani v. Nanni,
95 R.I. 153, 185 A. 2d 119 (1962); Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W. 2d 669
(1959); Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W. 2d 137
(1967).
7 Supra n. 6.
8 Id. at 813.
9 Id. at 814-15.
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WIFE'S LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
Direct Injury
The argument that the injury to the wife is indirect and thus not
compensable is not a tenable argument according to Judge Clark.10
The injury to the wife is directly traceable to the wrongdoing of the
tort feasor. Furthermore, how could such an argument be seriously
advanced when one considers that the identical damage caused to the
husband is regarded as a direct and proximate consequence of the de-
fendant's wrong? If the loss of the wife's consortium is a direct result
of the defendant's negligence insofar as the husband is concerned, then
it is obviously a direct and proximate result of the defendant's negli-
gence when the wife has suffered similar damages.
Furthermore, if the damage by reason of loss of consortium to the
wife is held to be a proper measure of damages for intentional wrong-
doing by a tortfeasor, then how could it be held otherwise as to a
negligent tortfeasor? Obviously, if the damages are sufficiently direct
when they are intentionally caused, then they would be equally as di-
rect when they are unintentionally but negligently caused.
Measure of Damages
An effective answer to the contention that a wife's loss of con-
sortium is too vague or indefinite to be capable of measurement in
pecuniary terms is given by MiUington v. Southeastern Elevator Co."
which holds that such a contention, logically extended, would likewise
hold that a jury is not competent to award damages for pain and suffer-
ing. It is further stated in Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc. 12 that the
wife may recover for the loss of only those elements of consortium
which represent a separate and distinct loss to her. Her damages would
then be computed by deducting the husband's compensation from the
damages awarded to her to avoid double recovery.
Although no specific scale exists to determine what elements of
consortium represent a separate and distinct loss to the wife, in most
cases they do not include any right of recovery for loss of financial sup-
port by the husband since only the husband is entitled to recover this
element, nor do they include any right of recovery for nursing services
since the husband is also entitled to recover for such services.' 3 And
if the wife's award includes damages her husband has already received,
her recovery will be deemed excessive and subject to reduction.14
However, the dissenting opinion in Novak held:
10 Id. at 815.
11 Supra n. 6.
12 Supra n. 6 at 543-544.
13 Kotsiris v. Ling, supra n. 6.
14 Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Strickland, 238 Ark. 284, 379 S.W. 2d 280 (1964).
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The judge who is able to avoid double damages by "accurately
delineating" the items that the husband has recovered or will re-
cover in another action in another court, and correctly instruct
the jury on the items of damages properly recoverable in this
particular case will indeed need the wisdom of a Solomon, not to
mention the utter confusion of the juries.15
The age-old argument of "double recovery" is, however, without
merit. Certainly there is a double recovery because both the husband
and the wife were individually and separately damaged. There is, how-
ever, no double recovery in the sense that duplication of the same dam-
age is awarded to either the husband or the wife. The fact that a single
marital relationship is involved does not negate the fact that if the
relationship is disturbed, both spouses are separately damaged. For
their separate damage each is obviously entitled to recovery.
In the final analysis, the proof of those elements of consortium
which represent a separate and distinct loss to the wife will be pre-
sented, as in the proof of pain and suffering, by presentation of testi-
mony and other evidence that bears on the issue; and the weight of
this evidence, or, in other words, the determination of the value of
damages for loss of consortium, is simply another matter for the jury's
consideration.
Common Law
That the common law recognizes no cause of action for the loss of
so-called "sentimental elements" of consortium in the absence of a
showing of loss of services is simply a rule without a reason. The
fallacy is well exposed by Judge Clark in Hitaffer when he explains
that there are many cases which have permitted a husband to re-
cover for alienation of affection or criminal conversation in which there
was absolutely no loss of material services of the wife.1
It should be mentioned at this point that the common law rule must
simply be abandoned with respect to this issue. The Married Women's
Acts promulgated throughout the land 17 have removed the procedural
disabilities of the woman by permitting her to sue in her own name, to
hold land in her own name, and to be entitled to the same rights to
which a man or a husband is entitled.
Smith v. Nicholas Building Co., for example, was decided in Ohio
in 1915. This was five years before the 19th Amendment was passed
which gave women the right to vote. The courts must be reminded
that old law must not be followed merely because it is old law. In his
15 Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., supra n. 6 at 548.
16 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., supra n. 6 at 815.
17 In Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.09: "A married woman may be sued as if she were
unmarried, and her husband may be joined with her only when the cause of action
is in favor or against both."
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dissenting opinion in the case of Troue v. Marker,18 Justice Sharp
commented on this very problem:
In the proper performance of its judicial function this court is con-
stantly engaged in examining and modifying prior precedents.
Although we use a logical format for this function the changes in
the law which result are more generally based on experience than
strict logic. When examined in the light of modern reality the
underlying basis of prior precedents of this court and our Su-
preme Court in regard to a wife's loss of consortium no longer
exists. I do not consider this to be a destruction of stare decisis
but a fulfillment of its proper function.' 8
Equal Protection
The essence of consortium is not merely the right to the services
of the spouse but also the right to the sentimental elements of the
marriage. These elements include love, affection, companionship and
sexual relations. 19 It is self evident that when negligence on the part
of an individual interferes with and damages these material and delicate
rights of either a wife or a husband, a reasonable and fair recovery of
damages should be permitted for such a wrong.
This right is protected by the "equal protection" clause of the 14th
Amendment of the United States Constitution, 20 as well as the consti-
tution of the various states.2 1 In fact, the Common Pleas Bench, as well
as the Appellate Bench, in the State of Ohio has held, even prior to
Clouston, that a rule which allows a husband recovery for loss of con-
sortium negligently caused while at the same time denying a similar
recovery to the wife ". . . constitutes discrimination which is so unjusti-
fiable as to be violative of due process of law contrary to the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution." 22
18 249 N.E. 2d 512, 523 (Ind. App. 1969); rev'd 252 N.E. 2d 800 (Ind. 1969).
19 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., Inc., supra n. 6 at 814.
20 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, provides: ". .. No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
laws."
21 See, for example, Ohio Const. art. I, § 16, which provides: "All courts shall be
open, and every person, for any injury done him in his land, goods, person, or repu-
tation, shall have remedy by due course of law and shall have justice administered
without denial. .. ."
22 Umpleby v. Dorsey, 10 Ohio Misc. 228, 227 N.E. 2d 274, 275-76 (C.P. 1967); Clem
v. Brown, 3 Ohio Misc. 167, 207 N.E. 2d 398 (C.P. 1965); Leffler v. Wiley, 15 Ohio App.
2d 67, 239 N.E. 2d 235 (1968) which stated at 236: "If a statute were to affirmatively
create such a right in a husband and yet deny it to a wife, such a classification based
on sex alone would violate Article I of the Constitution of Ohio and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The common-law distinction
between husband and wife in regard to consortium is equally based upon an unrea-
sonable, discredited concept of the subservience of the wife to her husband. The
courts should not perpetuate in the common law a discrimination that could not con-
stitutionally be created by statute."
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If women have an equal right to vote, they should likewise be per-
mitted an equal right to just compensation when they are damaged.
If a wife has duties in the marriage relationship, including the duty to
support her husband (as she does in some states, including Ohio,23
under certain circumstances), she should have the reciprocal right to
recover damages for negligent interference with and damage to her
marital relationship.
Separate Action
A number of jurisdictions which allow a wife an action for loss of
consortium still maintain that the claim can only be asserted in a joint
action with the husband's claim.24 The better rule is that since the
wife's injury is separate and distinct from her husband's and since her
injury is independently capable of measurement, she should be allowed
to bring an action independent of any action her husband might bring.
25
It has also been held that the wife's right of action is a substan-
tive right so that the effect of a decision granting the wife an action
after the husband's claim has already been settled is retroactive. 25
Therefore, if no right of action for loss of consortium existed for the
wife on the date of the husband's injury, but did arise in favor of the
wife after the husband's claim had been settled, the wife would under
these circumstances be entitled to bring a separate action.27
Although the wife may bring a separate action, her claim is still
subject to the same defenses which could properly be asserted against
the husband's claim. If, for example, the husband was contributorily
negligent, the wife's action would be barred by this defense to his
claim. 28 Nor are damages for loss of consortium recoverable in an in-
dependent action by the wife when her husband has been killed in-
stantaneously,29 since recovery is only allowable between time of injury
and death as it has been in a husband's action for loss of consortium of
his wife.3 0
23 Ohio Rev. Code § 3103.01: "Husband and wife contract towards each other obli-
gations of mutual respect, fidelity, and support."
24 Deems v, Western Maryland Railway Co., supra n. 6; Millington v. Southeastern
Elevator Co., supra n. 6; Ekalo v. Constructive Services Corp. of America, supra n. 6.
25 Tjaden v. Moses, 94 Ill. App. 2d 361, 237 N.E. 2d 562 (1968); Kotsiris v. Ling, supra
n. 6.
26 Shepherd v. Consumers Cooperative Association, 384 S.W. 2d 635 (Mo. 1964).
27 Edeler v. O'Brien, 38 Wis. 2d 691, 158 N.W. 2d 301 (1968) overruling Moran v.
Quality Aluminum Casting Co., supra n. 6, which held that the wife's action must be
asserted jointly with the husband's.
28 Logullo v. Joannides, 301 F. Supp. 722 (D. Del. 1969).
29 DeWitt v. B & C Machine Co., 25 Ohio St. 2d 40 (1971).
30 Shaweker v. Spinell, 125 Ohio St. 423, 181 N.E. 896 (1932).
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But it has also been held that the mere fact that a wife has not
prevailed in an action for bodily injury should not bar an independent
action by the husband.3' Equal protection would seem to demand that
the wife be granted the same privilege if she can show that the de-
fense which barred her husband's action will not bar her action.
The applicable Statute of Limitations is also a subject for considera-
tion in connection with the wife's separate cause of action. In Ohio,
an action for bodily injury must be brought within two years after the
cause arose,3 2 but this bodily injury must be sustained by the one
bringing the action.33 It is readily apparent that the wife has suffered
no bodily injury in connection with her action for loss of consortium.
Thus, the two year Statute of Limitations, while applying to her hus-
band's action for bodily injury, should not apply to her.
In Ohio, a four year Statute of Limitations applies to an injury to
any right of the plaintiff not arising from contract, bodily injury, or
property damage.34 Since consortium is a basic right of a spouse arising
from the marriage, it has been held in the case of a husband's action
for loss of consortium that any injury to this right falls within this
four year Statute of Limitations.35 Here again equal protection de-
mands that the wife's action for loss of consortium should also be per-
mitted the four years period after the negligent act which gave rise to
a cause of action. The application of the four year statute would thus
provide the wife the same Statute of Limitations for her loss of con-
sortium action as is afforded the husband.
Conclusion
The jurisdictions which still deny the wife the right of recovery of
damages for loss of consortium should review their position and recog-
nize that it is quite appropriate that the judiciary, as opposed to the
legislature, take the initiative in making this long overdue correc-
tion.3 6 As Justice Sharp stated in Troue v. Marker:
The legislature did not close the court house door to the wife for
her loss of consortium and I do not believe we are required to wait
for the legislature to open it. 3 7
31 Krant v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 132 Ohio St. 125, 5 N.E. 2d 324 (1936).
32 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10.
33 Krant v. Cleveland Ry. Co., supra n. 31 at 326.
34 Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.09.
35 Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Whitehead, 176 N.E. 583 (Ohio App. 1930).
36 See, for example: Deems v. Western Maryland Railway Co., supra n. 6 at 518;
Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., supra n. 6 at 143; Brown v. Georgia-
Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E. 2d 24, 32 (1953); Dini v. Naiditch,
supra n. 6 at 885; Montgomery v. Stephan, supra n. 6 at 233.
87 Supra n. 18 at 523.
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The correction of the old and unreasonable rule should be made
in a clear, unequivocal and uncomplicated fashion, without the attach-
ment of specious formulas or devious notions and conditions to con-
fuse a rule of law which should simply state that a wife has the same
right of recovery of damages for loss of consortium as is granted to
the husband.
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